Experimental triangulation of coalition signals: varying designs, converging results by Gschwend, Thomas & Meffert, Michael F.
www.ssoar.info
Experimental triangulation of coalition signals:
varying designs, converging results
Gschwend, Thomas; Meffert, Michael F.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Gschwend, T., & Meffert, M. F. (2010). Experimental triangulation of coalition signals: varying designs, converging
results.. Mannheim. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-257634
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Experimental Triangulation      1 
 
Experimental Triangulation of Coalition Signals:  
Varying Designs, Converging Results 
 
 
Michael F. Meffert 
Leiden University 
Department of Political Science 
Wassenaarseweg 52 
2333 AK Leiden  
Netherlands 
Phone. +31-71-527-3862 
Fax. +31-71-527-3815 
m.f.meffert@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
Thomas Gschwend 
University of Mannheim 
Center for Doctoral Studies in the 
Economic and Behavioral Sciences 
68131 Mannheim 
Germany 
Phone: +49-621-181-2087 
Fax: +49-621-181-3699 
gschwend@uni-mannheim.de 
 
 
1. Experiments as Flexible Tools for Theory Testing 
 
It is probably fair to say that political science has not been a welcoming 
discipline for experimental research (McDermott 2002). Our discipline has always 
expressed skepticism about the usefulness and the prospects of experimental designs 
to address the key research questions we care about. But the more political scientists 
have started to think carefully about causal relationships and what is required to test 
them, the more they came (or should come) to realize that our traditional 
methodologies and research designs are also not sufficient. The latter have serious 
limitations as well, and some of these limitations can be addressed by experimental 
methods. Because experimental designs have unique strengths compared to other 
research designs, it is not surprising that the use of experiments has evolved and 
increased over time (Morton and Williams 2010). Put simply, experiments are flexible 
tools for theory testing that allow us to establish causality by clearly separating causes 
and effects. 
In this chapter we will focus on one particular but striking advantage of 
experiments. When the key explanatory factor lacks variance, that is, when no 
observable data to test a theory is available, experiments can provide an elegant 
solution for this problem. Even if they come with their own difficulties and 
drawbacks, political science can only gain by embracing experimental designs. They 
not only provide an answer when traditional methods fail but also open up new 
opportunities and possibilities for political science research.  
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As an illustrative example throughout this chapter we use the effect of pre-
election coalition signals by parties on strategic vote decisions and discuss three 
different experimental approaches designed to test this effect. Coalition governments 
are a common outcome in many multiparty systems, and voters might take possible 
coalitions after the next election into account at the ballot box. During campaigns, 
parties sometimes signal to voters the desirable and undesirable coalition partners. For 
instance, German parties often resort to explicit appeals for strategic voting in the 
form of a ‘rental vote’ (Leihstimme). Supporters of one of the two major parties, 
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) or Social Democrats (SPD), are asked to ‘rent out’ 
their vote in favor of the preferred small coalition partner when the latter is in danger 
of falling short of a minimum vote threshold (e.g. the Free Democrats). In case of 
such a failure, the major party will likely have no prospects to lead the next 
government, even when running strong. A more detailed motivation of our substantive 
research question is provided below. First, however, we elaborate our argument that 
experiments are a flexible tool for theory testing, discuss some advantages and 
disadvantages of experimental designs, and introduce the concept of experimental 
triangulation. 
We start with the assumption that researchers want to test a theory. As 
textbooks instruct us, this requires a careful definition of the theoretical concepts, the 
derivation and specification of observable implications, and the selection of 
appropriate cases that allow the measurement of causes and effects (King et al. 1994, 
Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007). When selecting cases, researchers will often 
face the challenge that appropriate observable data is simply not available to 
adequately test a theory. Suppose we are interested in the effect of a particular 
contextual factor on individual behavior such as a coalition signal or other specific 
campaign messages. If such a message is sufficiently loud and clear, all informed 
voters will receive it. But how would we be able to determine if it had any effect? If 
the message was constant throughout the campaign, our key explanatory variable 
would lack variance. We have only data from this one election, a single case. Thus, all 
respondents in an election survey will have been exposed to the same message, and no 
respondent would have received an alternative, counterfactual message. It would not 
be possible to determine the impact of a constant message with any level of 
confidence. In fact, any political scientist interested in the effects of institutions and 
institutional rules on political behavior will almost certainly face a similar challenge.  
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What can be done in such a situation? If increasing the number of cases is not 
an option, crafting a clever experimental design can provide a methodological 
solution. Experiments are ideal for exactly this kind of situation because they enable 
the researcher to create the necessary variance. Guided by theory, the researcher can 
operationalize and manipulate the explanatory factor(s) in such a way that meaningful 
causal tests become possible. Experiments essentially create scenarios that represent 
different states of the world. By randomly assigning the manipulated explanatory 
factors to participants, we can make comparisons and estimate the causal effects. The 
differences (or lack thereof) between treatment and control groups will tell us whether 
participants react and behave as hypothesized. 
Reducing the complexity of the real world to theoretically meaningful but 
often very narrow differences naturally raises the question of external validity. A 
simple manipulation does not represent reality as we experience it in everyday life, 
nor should it do that. The advantage of experiments is to submit hypotheses to causal 
tests, if necessary by breaking up complex causal chains into smaller steps that can be 
tested individually. Thus, experiments can systematically address what happens under 
theoretically relevant circumstances, even if they may not occur this way in the real 
world (e.g. Mook 1983). After successfully demonstrating the predictive value of a 
theory, researchers are well advised to address the external validity of their findings. 
This might require additional experiments or observational data from surveys and 
similar designs. In fact, the combination of complementary research designs might 
often be the best strategy. 
Experiments are by no means a free lunch. They frequently require tough 
decisions. There are no cookbook recipes that tell us what to do and how to test a 
particular theory. Different experimental designs come with different advantages and 
disadvantages, and a researcher will have to decide what is most appropriate in a 
given situation. For example, a researcher who wants to rule out all confounding 
influences on her measures of causes and effects needs to fully control all aspects of 
the study by creating or inducing all key variables, including the preferences of 
participants. Any measure that relies on preexisting preferences is not fully controlled 
by the researcher and might introduce some confounding factor. At other times, 
however, it might make perfect sense to leverage participants’ preexisting 
preferences, especially in realistic decision contexts. It would be futile to try to 
directly manipulate a powerful predisposition such as party identification. A simple 
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party label will automatically elicit strong reactions and beliefs. A smart experimental 
design will at minimum simply measure and control such powerful reactions but 
ideally take advantage of them and utilize them within the experimental design.  
What is the best experimental design? The short answer is that it does not 
exist. Every researcher will have to decide on the most appropriate design to test a 
certain theory in a given context. If a single experiment cannot give a complete and 
satisfying answer, as it is frequently the case, more than one experiment might be the 
solution. We call such a research strategy experimental triangulation. Researchers 
vary the operationalization of key measures or the setup of the experiment in order to 
test different aspects and mechanisms of the hypothesized cause-and-effect 
relationship. Taken together, this set of experiments offers a more complete and valid 
explanation of the social phenomenon of interest. 
The term triangulation is borrowed from celestial navigation where it indicates 
a technique to infer one's geodetic position from the measurement of different sights 
such as the sun and the horizon (a role taken over by satellites for modern GPS-based 
navigation). In the social sciences, the concept can be traced back to the idea of 
improving measurement by using different measures. More specifically, Campbell 
and Fiske (1959) proposed the multitrait-multimethod matrix to obtain more valid 
measures of traits. The first explicit reference to triangulation we are aware of was 
made by Webb et al. (1966): 
 
Once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent 
measurement processes, the uncertainty of its interpretation is greatly reduced. 
The most persuasive evidence comes through a triangulation of measurement 
processes. If a proposition can survive the onslaught of a series of imperfect 
measures, with all their irrelevant error, confidence should be placed in it. Of 
course, this confidence is increased by minimizing error in each instrument 
and by a reasonable belief in the different and divergent effects of the source 
of error. (p. 3). 
 
The concept of triangulation has been extended beyond measurement in 
several ways. Denzin (1970) outlined various types of triangulation, among them the 
use of independent data sources (data triangulation), different researchers 
(investigator triangulation), and different research methodologies (method 
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triangulation). While not without criticism (e.g. Blaikie 1991), triangulation can be 
defined as a process in which different measurement strategies or sources of 
information validate each other and overcome their potential individual weaknesses to 
enhance the confidence in our conclusions.  
Like multiple measures of a single concept, we can talk about triangulation 
with a multi-method approach when we devise independent tests of the same theory 
with different methods. If multiple but complementary theory tests come to similar 
conclusions, we have more confidence in the research findings. But as Mathison 
(1988) points out, different measures, methods, and sources might not always 
converge but rather offer inconsistent or even contradictory outcomes. A triangulation 
strategy consequently can lead to a much more complex and thorough understanding 
of a social phenomenon. 
In this chapter, we elaborate how scholars can, within the same 
methodological paradigm, creatively leverage different experimental designs to 
triangulate their findings within the same research program. With multiple 
experiments, we can use the specific strengths of one particular experimental 
paradigm to address and compensate for the limitations of another experimental 
paradigm. The obvious advantage in contrast to, say, a regular multi-method 
approach, is that through experimental triangulation scholars do not have to 
compromise the strengths of experimental designs per se with the use of other 
methodologies to triangulate theory tests. While multi-method designs are of course 
still possible and even desirable, we argue that the particular strength of experimental 
triangulation is that it facilitates the use of experiments as a flexible tool to devise 
several independent tests of the same theory. Of course, different designs might 
sometimes lead to different answers, raising the question about how to evaluate and 
interpret such divergent results. We will return to this question in our conclusion. 
 
2. Illustrative Example: Coalition Signals and Strategic Voting in Multiparty 
Systems  
 
In first-past-the-post systems a strategic voter is typically defined as someone 
who cast his or her vote for a party other than the most preferred party because the 
former has a better chance of winning (Cox 1997, Fischer 2004). According to the 
theory of strategic voting, a strategic vote requires an instrumental motivation and 
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rational expectations about the outcome of the next election. According to this 
definition, it is necessarily insincere. At first glance, studying strategic voting in 
multiparty systems might seem to be a hopeless endeavor (but see Cox 1997). But 
more recently, several studies have offered evidence that strategic voting not only 
makes sense in PR systems but have offered supporting evidence as well (e.g. 
Abramson et al. 2010, Blais et al. 2006, Bargsted and Kedar 2009, Meffert and 
Gschwend 2010). These studies suggest that voters not only defect from marginal 
parties but have a variety of reasons to cast a strategic vote. 
The theory of strategic voting assumes that voters cast their ballot in order to 
maximize their expected utility based on their party preferences and their expectations 
about the outcome of the next election (Cox 1997). With coalition governments, 
strategic voters must not only form expectations about the likelihood that parties win 
representation in parliament but also consider which coalitions are viable and likely. 
Based on these expectations, they can decide how to vote in order to best influence 
government formation, if only to influence the weight of each party in an almost 
certain coalition (Meffert and Gschwend 2007). Given the complexity of the decision 
task, it is likely that voters use simple heuristics such as coalition signals by parties to 
simplify the decision task. Especially coalition signals should help voters to narrow 
down the large number of theoretically possible coalitions to the relevant few. 
At the individual level, strategic voting is typically studied with survey data 
from particular elections. The challenge to determine the effect of coalition signals on 
voting behavior is by now a familiar one: a single election usually does not provide 
much variation in the key independent variables, polls and coalition signals. Both tend 
to be fairly stable and consistent before elections, and every voter will receive more or 
less the same information. Consequently, it is not possible to determine with 
confidence that a strategic voter would have decided differently if the polls had 
suggested a different election outcome or if parties had offered different coalition 
signals. In order to overcome this lack of variance we turn to experimental designs. 
This strategy allows us to create theoretically relevant decision scenarios in and 
outside the laboratory that should either facilitate or inhibit strategic voting. We use 
experimental manipulations to create variance in the key explanatory factors, and the 
comparison of treatment and control groups allows us to directly test our hypotheses 
about coalition signals.  
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3. Coalition Signals in Three Experimental Designs  
 
Testing the causal effects of coalition signals requires that coalition signals 
vary, either in terms of their presence or absence or in terms of their nature (valence), 
advocating (positive) or ruling out (negative) a specific coalition. The basic design 
and operationalization can follow a simple logic. By randomly assigning different 
versions of the coalition signal to participants, it is possible to determine whether 
signals have the hypothesized impact by comparing the key outcome variable for the 
different experimental groups. Experiments allow the systematic variation of coalition 
signals and measure their effect on randomly assigned groups. 
Experiments can take many different shapes and forms. The settings can range 
from a tightly controlled lab environment over a real world field setting to (often 
representative) surveys, and methodological rules and standards differ by tradition 
(Morton and Williams 2010). Experiments in the economic tradition tend to confront 
participants with abstract, context-free, and transparent decision scenarios. The 
information available to participants might be incomplete, creating uncertainty, but it 
should never be deceptive or false. In order to rule out external and potentially 
confounding influences, preferences are induced and assigned by the experimenter 
and not based on existing preferences of participants. This gives the experimenter in 
economic experiments a very high degree of control. The abstract nature of these 
experiments and the induced preferences make it possible to assess the quality of 
decision making in a straightforward manner. Because the correct decision is known 
to the experimenter, it is very easy to determine good and bad or optimal and wrong 
decisions. Participants experience success and failure as monetary gains and losses. 
Following these basic principles, we designed an economic experiment that 
presented participants with an abstract game with fictitious parties and induced party 
preferences in a laboratory setting (Meffert and Gschwend 2007). The coalition 
signals were operationalized as salient information but associated with high ambiguity 
and uncertainty. The quality of the decision was determined as a monetary payoff. 
Table 1 presents an overview of the key characteristics of our studies. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Psychological experiments, on the other hand, try to create realistic decision 
scenarios, not in terms of mundane realism, but in the sense that they rely on pre-
existing individual preferences and differences and try to pose decision scenarios that 
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capture the attention and involvement of the participants (McDermott 2002). A key 
difference to economic experiments is the frequent use of concealment and deception 
for experimental manipulations. The information given to participants is optimized to 
create a convincing manipulation, not to provide objective and verifiable facts. From 
an ethical perspective, the use of concealment and deception makes it mandatory that 
participants are debriefed at the end of the study. Any misrepresentation of facts needs 
to be corrected.  
Psychological experiments of electoral decision making rely frequently on 
fictitious scenarios in order to control the amount and content of information available 
to participants. However, it is very common to use existing parties and existing party 
preferences, relinquishing much more control than economic experiments. The 
psychological experiment described below went one step further by embedding it in 
two ongoing state election campaigns in Germany (Meffert and Gschwend, 
forthcoming). The decision scenario presented to participants was thus highly 
realistic, and most information provided to participants was taken from the actual 
party platforms. However, the experiment still took place in a laboratory setting with a 
convenience sample of student participants. The experiment used deception to 
operationalize and manipulate coalition signals and poll results. The manipulated 
information was embedded in a subtle and unobtrusive way in other campaign 
information. The goal was to create theoretically relevant decision scenarios that 
should (not) induce strategic voting. The key dependent variable was a hypothetical 
vote decision in the state election, but not tied to any monetary payoff or incentive 
(though participants received a fixed participation fee). 
Laboratory experiments usually use convenience samples that pose a challenge 
to external validity and the generalization of the study results to the world outside. In 
this respect, cross-sectional surveys with a general population sample have a clear 
advantage over laboratory experiments, even if they fall short when assessing causal 
relationships. That said, it is sometimes possible to combine the advantages of 
randomized manipulations and control of laboratory experiments with the 
representative nature of general population surveys. If a manipulation can be included 
in a survey questionnaire, the combination of a randomized experimental 
manipulation with a representative population sample is a near perfect solution.  
In the survey experiment described below, respondents were interviewed in a 
pre-election survey and confronted with four scenarios in the form of short vignettes, 
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in a randomized order. The vignettes presented respondents with different coalition 
signals and asked for any (hypothetical) changes in vote intentions. Needless to say, 
these respondents did not receive a financial incentive for participation or ‘optimal’ 
answers. 
 
3.1 Economic Experiment 
 
The main purpose of the economic experiment was a causal test of strategic 
voting in multiparty systems with proportional representation, minimum vote 
thresholds, and coalition governments under ideal conditions—all participations had 
an induced monetary incentive for strategic voting and no incentive for expressive or 
habitual voting (for details, see Meffert and Gschwend 2007). An important initial 
design decision was to use a decision scenario with four parties because three parties 
allow only for a trivial number of coalitions while five parties already lead to an 
(exponentially increasing) explosive number of coalitions and highly complex 
decision scenarios. The election scenario consisted of four parties (A to D) competing 
for the votes of 15 voters, distributed randomly in a two-dimensional space. Voters 
could maximize their expected utility by moving the location of next government as 
close as possible to their own location, compared or relative to the government 
location after a sincere vote for the preferred (closest) party. The reduced distance 
constituted the monetary payoff, while wrong decisions that moved the government 
further away from the voter location constituted a monetary loss. A voter decision (or 
government) is called optimal if no other party choice (government) leads to a higher 
payoff. The participant was the only swing voter while the other 14 simulated voters 
always supported their preferred party. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The critical component of the decision scenarios was how coalition 
governments would be formed after an election. The procedure followed four 
sequential rules. The first and very obvious criterion was an absolute majority of seats 
in parliament for a single party. If no party had the support of a majority, a coalition 
government became necessary. The key rule was the minimum distance of two (or 
three) parties in the political space that reached an absolute majority. The following 
two rules were used to break any ties that might exist after the second rule. First, a 
two-party coalition would beat a three-party coalition (minimum number of parties), 
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and if this still could not resolve the tie, the coalition with the lower vote share would 
be formed (minimum vote share). If all four rules failed to produce a government, the 
election ended in a stalemate without any payoff. It is important to note that 
government formation was explicitly and entirely based on the electoral strength and 
proximity of the parties. Pre-electoral coalition signals played no part in government 
formation, and thus should not have played any role for voters. Participants were fully 
informed and familiar with the rules of government formation.  
The experiment tested the influence of two critical information sources, polls 
and coalition signals, by manipulating their availability to voters. Polls were based on 
the actual distribution of the party preferences in a given election scenario and 
available with an 80 per cent probability. But even if not available, voters would still 
receive information about the relative size of the parties, whether it was a major (>25 
per cent) or a minor (<25 per cent) party. The operationalization of the coalition signal 
was more difficult to implement. Ideally, an experimental manipulation is fully 
randomized and independent from other manipulated factors such as, in this case, the 
strength and location (or proximity) of the parties. If implemented this way, the signal 
would show two (or three) randomly chosen parties. However, a signal generated this 
way would frequently be meaningless, for example by displaying two small parties or 
two parties at the opposite ends of the political space. It would have no meaning and 
participants would not take it seriously. The signal had to be both plausible but 
uncertain, that is, sometimes providing ‘good’ information and sometimes ‘bad’ 
information—good in the sense that the coalition in the signal would indeed lead to a 
successful, optimal outcome while a bad signal would indicate a coalition that 
represents an unsuccessful election outcome. Consequently, the coalition signal was 
based on a simple decision rule: it showed the two parties closest to each other but 
required that at least one of the two parties was a major party. This rule essentially 
represents a simple heuristic for government formation that might or might not be 
successful. It is also based on information that was always available to participants: 
the distance of the parties in the political space and the approximate size of the parties 
(that is, at least one major party). 
In about half of the randomly generated decision scenarios selected for the 
experiment, the signal showed the coalition that represented the optimal government 
for the voter. In the other half, it displayed a suboptimal government. Note that even if 
the signal shows the optimal government, these parties do not necessarily include the 
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party that the participant should vote for in order to produce this government. While 
the parties in the signal were thus determined by a simple rule, the visibility of the 
signal to participants was randomized with equal probability. Participants were only 
told that the signal shows parties that wish to form a coalition, not how the signal was 
generated. Because the coalition signal played no role in actual government 
formation, it should be irrelevant information for participants. 
The results of the experiment, however, show that the signal did influence the 
decisions of the participants. Table 2 distinguishes between easy elections with an 
optimal coalition signal and difficult elections with a suboptimal signal as well as the 
availability of poll and signal information. If we take the decision scenarios without 
polls and signals as the baseline, participants were able to make optimal decisions in 
51 per cent of the easy elections and 31 per cent of the difficult elections. The 
availability of polls increases the proportion of optimal decisions to 64 and 41 per 
cent, respectively. The impact of the signal, when no poll was available, is equally 
strong, but conditional on the quality. Good signals in easy elections increase the 
share of optimal decisions to 65 per cent while bad signals in difficult elections lower 
the share of optimal decisions to 22 per cent. If both the poll and signal are available, 
the share of optimal decisions in easy elections increased further, but only slightly, to 
68 per cent. In difficult elections, the availability of a poll appears to have helped 
voters to counteract the bad signal. They made optimal decisions in 38 per cent of the 
elections. The results of the economic experiment suggest that even voters with a 
strategic (monetary) incentive tend to rely on coalition signals as a heuristic. If the 
signal is accurate, it can very well substitute for a poll, but if it is bad, voters who 
follow it tend to make the wrong decisions. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
3.2 Psychological Experiment 
 
The psychological experiment operationalized coalition signals in a highly 
realistic way. As before, the experiment focused on strategic voting and was 
conducted in a laboratory setting. However, it was embedded in two real, 
contemporaneous German state election campaigns in January 2006. The general 
design and procedure of the study involved exposure to campaign information about 
the five major parties, with information taken from actual election platforms of the 
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parties. Participants played the role of a voter and were instructed to inform 
themselves before the upcoming election. The information was presented on a 
computer-based information board that always showed six newspaper-style headlines 
with information. Clicking on a headline opened another window with the associated 
short article (see Meffert and Gschwend, forthcoming, for details).  
The main purpose of the experiment was to test a specific version of strategic 
voting in PR systems with minimum vote thresholds, threshold insurance. Supporters 
of a major party might vote for the preferred junior coalition partner if the latter is in 
danger of falling short of the threshold. Previous research has shown mixed support in 
favor of such rental votes or Leihstimmen (e.g., Gschwend 2007, Pappi and Thurner 
2002). At the same time, supporters of small parties that are fairly certain to fall short 
of the threshold should defect from their party and rather vote for another party that 
will affect government formation in a beneficial way. In order to test these 
assumptions and the role of polls and explicit coalition signals by parties, the study 
used the actual party preferences of the participants. 
The manipulation of polls and coalition signals targeted specifically the 
preferred parties of each participant. At the beginning of an experimental session, 
participants indicated their party preferences by ranking the five most relevant parties, 
the two major parties Christian Democrats (CDU) and Social Democrats (SPD) and 
the three minor parties Free Democrats (FDP), the Greens (Die Grünen), and the Left 
Party (Die Linke/WASG). This ranking determined which parties were used for the 
subsequent manipulations. First, the highest ranked major party determined the 
assignment of a participant to one of two states, CDU supporters to Baden-
Württemberg and SPD supporters to Rhineland-Palatinate. These parties were the 
respective incumbent parties in each state and both were expected to be re-elected by 
large margins. In other words, the expected winner in each election was held constant 
for all study participants. It should be noted that the study was conducted in the city of 
Mannheim, located right on the border between these two states, allowing for a fairly 
seamless assignment of participants to these different states.  
Next, the most preferred small party was used for the poll and coalition signal 
manipulation. The poll manipulation varied the expected performance of the small 
party above and below the minimum vote threshold. The signal manipulation used the 
preferred major and minor party to either explicitly mention this coalition or avoid 
any reference to it. In short, the two most preferred parties of each participant were 
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used for manipulations in order to create standardized election scenarios, but the 
manipulations themselves, the closeness to the threshold and an explicit coalition 
signal, were randomized. 
Participants were exposed to manipulated polls and signals in two ways during 
the ‘campaign.’ Participants were exposed to always six headlines on the information 
board that changed in a fixed interval of 45 seconds, whether or not participants 
clicked on and read any articles. Five headlines on each screen always represented the 
issue positions or candidates of the five parties (one headline for each party). The 
sixth headline covered either polls or other, fairly generic state information. In total, 
the 90 headlines and articles available to respondents covered 13 issues and two 
candidates for each party as well as five manipulated polls, five generic polls, and five 
state-specific but generic topics. The order was randomized. 
After two screens with headlines, the campaign was interrupted for a pre-
election poll that first asked participants to indicate their vote intention at that point, 
followed by a screen ostensibly showing the results of an actual state election poll 
(Figure 2). Participants saw a table with the manipulated numerical poll results on the 
left and a verbal summary (for numerically challenged participants) on the right. At 
the bottom were two statements attributed to the two preferred parties of each 
participant. Phrased in the style of newspaper headlines, they either mentioned a 
coalition or just stated typical campaign statements in response to the poll. Using the 
parties CDU and FDP as examples, the statements without signal read: 
 
CDU: Poll confirms we are on the right track; Will fight for every vote 
FDP: Campaign will be tough; Need to better motivate supporters 
 
In the version with a coalition signal (as shown in Figure 2), the statement read 
instead: 
 
CDU: Poll confirms we are on the right track; Hope for coalition with FDP 
FDP: Campaign will be tough; Appeal for ‘rental votes’ by CDU supporters 
 
Note that the first part of these statements was always identical and only the second 
part changed. All participants saw this screen and thus were guaranteed to be exposed 
to the signal manipulation. 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
The second opportunity to encounter the manipulated information was as part 
of the headlines and articles on the information board. However, participants had to 
actively choose and read these five articles with manipulated poll and signal 
information. It does provide a hard behavioral measure of interest in and exposure to 
poll information. The five articles repeated the same poll and signal information from 
the pre-election poll discussed above. Each article focused on a different aspect but 
basically restated the same information. As a rule of thumb, one or two paragraphs 
restated the poll results and one paragraph discussed coalitions, either mentioning the 
explicit coalition signal or at a fairly unspecific level. In each experimental condition, 
every participant was exposed to the same information or content. Only the names of 
the parties changed according to the individual party preferences of each participant. 
In terms of programming, the party names were ‘variables’ in a text mask (which also 
included all the verbs associated with the parties because, grammatically, the Greens 
are a plural noun and require a different verb form than the singular nouns FDP and 
WASG).  
The operationalization of polls and coalition signals in this experiment has the 
clear advantage of tapping the actual party preferences of the participants and using a 
real election campaign as decision scenario and backdrop. This clearly improves the 
external validity of the study but also imposes certain limitations. First, reality 
constrains the manipulation of polls and signals to a plausible range. For the polls, the 
winning major party in each state could not be changed, only the forecasts for the 
small parties could plausibly range from 4 to 10 per cent (with a minimum vote 
threshold of 5 per cent). The WASG was running for the first time in both states, 
creating some uncertainty about its strength. The only baseline salient to participants 
could have been the results of the previous general election several months earlier in 
which the three minor parties reached fairly similar and strong results (FDP: 9.8 per 
cent, Green Party: 8.1 per cent, Left Party/PDS/WASG: 8.7 per cent).  
The coalition signal posed a bigger challenge. In both states, the FDP was the 
junior partner in the incumbent coalition and thus the designated coalition partner 
after the next election. In both states, however, the situation was more fluid and 
alternative coalitions could not be ruled out. In both states, the Greens were a 
plausible alternative coalition partner while the WASG was more or less ruled out by 
both major parties. Because the signal manipulation automatically used the preferred 
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parties of each participant, the signal could have shown fairly absurd combinations, in 
particular a coalition of the conservative CDU with the far-left WASG. This was 
judged to be an acceptable risk, correctly as it turned out, because such a party 
preference ranking was highly unlikely. Less serious but more difficult to solve was 
the fact that some signals would show the incumbent coalition while others would 
propose a new coalition. Thus, the coalition signals had to be phrased very carefully. 
They were attributed, for example, to ‘different politicians in both parties’ to make 
them plausible for any coalition, incumbent or not. The phrases used typical, 
sometimes off-the-record statements by politicians during real campaigns. Given this 
complexity, the whole experimental design was tested first in a large pilot study. This 
test was successful, but as a result, it became necessary to include another poll 
condition in the main experiment. The manipulation checks of poll and signal 
manipulations were successful as well, and post-study comments and feedback by 
participants indicated hardly any suspicion of the manipulated polls and coalition 
signals.  
The results, however, brought some surprises. Only ten participants (or 7.5 per 
cent of participants in the close-poll conditions that were expected to induce strategic 
voting) could be classified as strategic voters, pre-empting a meaningful analysis of 
the effect of coalition signals on strategic voting. However, about a quarter of the 
participants did defect from their top-ranked party and voted ‘insincerely’ for some 
other party, independent of the poll manipulation. In a multivariate model predicting 
insincere voting, coalition signals have a modest positive impact, again suggesting 
that coalition signals do play a role in vote decisions. But compared to the strong 
signal effect in the economic experiment, the realistic but fairly subtle signal in the 
psychological experiment appears to have only a minor impact.  
The small number of strategic voters can in part be explained by one of the 
key and necessary design features. Because the preferred large party was always the 
certain winner and never faced real competition or even trailed the opponent, this 
party was essentially removed from strategic considerations that might exist 
otherwise. Only a replication in other contexts would allow a test of strategic voting 
under such circumstances. Last but not least, the manipulation of coalition signals 
during a real election campaign carries a significant risk because real parties might 
make an announcement during data collection that might undermine the study 
purpose. In our case, this did not happen. 
Experimental Triangulation      16 
 
 
3.3 Survey Experiment 
 
Experimental manipulations can also be included in representative population 
surveys, though with less control and the need for fairly obvious manipulations. 
Coalition signals are very well suited for this purpose because they merely require that 
survey respondents are exposed to them before the relevant questions. Thus, our third 
implementation of coalition signals is fairly straightforward. As part of a 
representative pre-election survey before the 2006 Austrian General Election, 
participants were exposed to four different vignettes of hypothetical coalition 
announcements by Austrian parties. As in the psychological experiment, a real 
election campaign as decision context and background always poses the acute risk 
that real events might interfere with the manipulations, such as a party making an 
unexpected coalition announcement. Unlike laboratory experiments with fictitious 
decision tasks, a survey that is several weeks in the field offers hardly any control 
over contextual factors and the study setting that might undermine the manipulated 
messages. Consequently, the coalition signals had to be phrased explicitly and 
transparently as hypothetical statements in order to work even in a changed setting.  
In order to both avoid such surprises and to create sharply contrasting 
vignettes, the hypothetical coalitions always mixed and matched one of the two major 
Austrian parties, the conservative People’s Party (ÖVP) or the Social Democrats 
(SPÖ), with one of the two smaller parties that were expected to perform very well in 
the election, the moderate but left-of-center Greens (Die Grünen) and the far-right and 
populist FPÖ (which incidentally was fairly explicit in ruling out any participation in 
government).  
These vignettes were presented shortly after asking the standard question 
about vote intention. They were introduced by the statement that ‘[m]ost parties have 
not made a clear announcement about possible coalitions after the election’ and 
followed by four vignettes, in randomized order:  
 
‘For which party would you vote if the Greens would clearly reject a coalition 
with the SPÖ and announce the intention to form a coalition with the ÖVP?’  
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‘For which party would you vote if the Greens would clearly reject a coalition 
with the ÖVP and announce the intention to form a coalition with the SPÖ?’  
 
‘For which party would you vote if the FPÖ would drop its intention to not 
participate in any coalition and rather announce the intention to form a 
coalition with the ÖVP?’  
 
‘For which party would you vote if the FPÖ would drop its intention to not 
participate in any coalition and rather announce the intention to form a 
coalition with the SPÖ?’ 
 
The response to each vignette was recorded with the same party list that was used for 
the standard vote intention question. This allows within-respondent comparisons of 
changes in (hypothetical) vote intentions.  
Because the vignettes focus on specific parties but were given to all 
respondents, it is reasonable to expect effects primarily on those respondents who are 
directly affected by these coalition signals, in particular supporters of the Greens and 
the FPÖ. Table 3 gives a short illustration how respondents reacted to the vignettes. 
Among supporters of the Green Party, a signal in favor of the ÖVP and against the 
SPÖ led to a considerable drop of support while a signal in favor of the SPÖ did not 
change the support at all. The latter was the preferred coalition of a large majority of 
Green Party supporters. Among FPÖ supporters, however, any departure from the 
declared governmental abstinence, whether in favor of the ÖVP or the SPÖ, led to a 
drop of support for the FPÖ. In both cases, coalition signals affect the vote intentions 
of supporters. For the Greens, the coalition partner matters and the SPÖ is the clear 
favorite. For FPÖ supporters, government participation in itself leads to a drop of 
support, suggesting that at least some supporters see their vote as a protest vote 
against the mainstream parties. Even if the effects are again more limited, the third 
study once more supports the notion that coalition signals matter, in a real election 
and with a representative sample of voters. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
4. Conclusion: Comparing and Evaluating the Results of Different Experiments 
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How do we know that coalition signals actually have an effect on voters’ 
decision making? If we had merely used observational data, we would almost 
certainly have faced the problem that our key independent variable, coalition signals, 
would not have varied much in each of the election campaigns. We simply would not 
have the necessary variance for a meaningful test of our hypothesis. Instead, we used 
different experimental designs that allowed us to ‘inject’ variance by manipulating 
coalition signals in theoretically meaningful ways. This approach makes a test of the 
causal hypothesis possible and suggests that coalition signals matter, and not only for 
strategic voting.  
The different operationalizations of coalition signals demonstrate that 
experiments are flexible tools to test causal relationships even if there is not enough 
variance in the key explanatory variable. Given that the lack of variance is a frequent 
problem for research questions in political science, researchers would be well advised 
to consider and adopt experimental strategies as well. It can not only overcome the 
limits of other designs but provide the opportunity to address new and seemingly 
intractable questions. And using an experimental triangulation strategy by employing 
different types of experiments can further enhance and strengthen our confidence in 
the findings. In our case, three experimental designs from different experimental 
traditions—economic, psychological, and survey research—have given us a mostly 
converging, sometimes inconsistent, but never contradictory pattern of results. Table 4 
provides a brief summary. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The unambiguously good news is that no matter the type of experiment, 
coalition signals matter! We saw in the economic experiment (that deliberately 
induced in all participants a strategic mindset) that the manipulation of coalition 
signals was highly effective. Coalition signals facilitated strategic voting and emerged 
as a useful heuristic that simplified participants’ decision task. But it is a risky 
heuristic because a given coalition signal might involve parties that are not the 
optimal vote choice for a participant. Thus, coalition signals can help but also lead 
voters astray if they trust them blindly. 
In the psychological experiment (in which voters could follow either strategic 
or expressive motivations in a real election context), we found merely a marginal 
impact of coalition signals on participants’ vote choice. Voters were more likely to 
defect from their top-ranked party and voted for some other party when coalition 
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signals were present. The fact that participants deserted their preferred party even if 
the polls did not indicate any instrumental benefit suggests that coalition signals affect 
not just strategic voting but have a more complex impact. It suggests that coalition 
signals are a simple heuristic for both strategic and merely insincere voters but might 
even elicit the expression of a genuine coalition preference. The experiment suggests 
that the investigation of coalition signals requires a closer look at coalition 
preferences as well.  
The results of the survey experiment replicate and complement the results of 
the two previous studies. Coalition signals changed respondents vote intention 
systematically in our representative sample of Austrian voters. We find evidence for 
those effects not for all signals and on all respondents but primarily on those who are 
directly affected by the signals. In contrast to the two other studies where coalition 
signals were an unobtrusive facet of the information environment, the vignettes in the 
survey experiment explicitly linked the coalition signals with the vote intention. Thus, 
respondents could not even process this information heuristically. They were rather 
forced to explicitly and deliberately think about the consequences of different signals 
on their vote decision, leading to clear and observable shifts in vote intentions. 
Our triangulation strategy with different types of experiments leverages the 
strength of each design to address the limitations of the others. For example, the 
economic experiment gave us full control over participants’ preferences, the signal 
manipulation, and any contextual influences. In the survey experiment, our control 
was very weak because we had no influence over what happened in the actual 
campaign. On the other hand, the survey experiment used a real election and was 
based on a representative sample, giving it much higher generalizability than the 
convenience sample in our laboratory experiments.  
In terms of internal validity, the psychological experiment falls somewhere in 
middle. The standardized decision scenarios and randomized manipulations certainly 
provide a high degree of internal validity, but it is rather difficult to find the 
hypothesized effects. Subtle manipulations met real and strong political preferences, 
severely limiting our ability to ‘push’ participants around.  
For a pure theory test, our concern is more with internal than external validity. 
The fact that we can replicate the strong effects of coalition signals in the abstract 
economic experiment in weaker form with both a laboratory experiment and a survey 
experiment during real election campaigns gives us the confidence to conclude that 
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coalition signals are an important factor that requires more attention in future 
research.  
How can we best assess and compare the different impact of coalition signals 
across very different experiments? We have two answers. First, it remains puzzling 
for us how to directly compare the size of the effects, and in fact it might even be a 
futile endeavor. These differences might merely be random, but it is a priori more 
likely that different types of experiments exert their own ‘design effects’ similar to so-
called ‘house effects’ of different survey institutes that often produce different 
numbers even when surveying the same population at the same time. A third 
possibility is that the differences vary systematically with the different contexts in 
which they were conducted. Only replications with similar experiments in different 
contexts will allow us to answer this question. On a more positive note, the second 
answer is that the findings of all three experiments support and complement each 
other while indicating stronger and weaker effects under different conditions. This, 
after all, is the ultimate purpose of experimental triangulation. 
To sum up, we argued that experiments are flexible tools for theory testing. 
Our results indicate that experiments are particularly useful in situations when key 
explanatory factors lack variation. This is a challenge we often face when designing a 
study. We have shown some of the strengths and weaknesses of different 
experimental designs, and the benefits of using an experimental triangulation strategy 
to both conduct conclusive causal tests of our theories and to generate a 
complementary and more generalizable pattern of findings. Our hope is that we have 
convinced our readers that despite all the difficulties and drawbacks, well-designed 
experiments offer new possibilities for interesting research in political science. 
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Table 1: Key Characteristics of Studies 
 
Key Aspect Economic Lab Experiment 
Psychological Lab 
Experiment 
Survey 
Experiment 
Context Abstract Game Real Campaign Real Campaign 
Party Preferences Induced (no ties) 
Measured 
(ties possible) 
Measured 
(ties possible) 
Coalition Signals 
Salient & 
Transparent 
(uncertain) 
Subtle & 
Unobtrusive 
(realistic) 
Salient & 
Transparent 
(hypothetical) 
Vote Decisions Monetary Payoff (optimal) 
Hypothetical Vote 
Decision 
Hypothetical Vote 
Decision 
Sample Convenience Sample (Students) 
Convenience 
Sample (Students) 
Representative 
Sample 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Share of Optimal Decisions by Election Difficulty and Available 
Information 
 
 No Info Poll Only Signal Only Poll & Signal
 
Scenarios 
% (BSE) 
N 
% (BSE) 
N 
% (BSE) 
N 
% (BSE) 
N 
     
Easy Elections 51.7 (3.1) 64.2 (1.5) 64.8 (2.8) 67.7 (1.4) 
 269 1097 301 1123 
     
Difficult Elections 30.9 (2.3) 40.8 (1.2) 21.8 (2.1) 37.6 (1.2) 
 408 1651 427 1699 
     
Note: Entries are proportions, with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses and 
the number of decisions in each cell. The number of decisions varies due to the 
random assignment of poll and signal manipulation, the former with unequal 
probability. 
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Table 3: Vote Intention for Preferred Party of Green Party and FPÖ Supporters 
 
 Vote Intention for Preferred Party (PP) 
  
Initial 
Vignette with 
ÖVP-PP Signal 
Vignette with 
SPÖ-PP Signal 
Preferred Party % (SE) % (SE) % (SE) 
    
Greens (n = 308) 65.9 (2.7) 53.6 (2.8) 65.6 (2.7) 
FPÖ (n = 86) 62.7 (5.2) 51.2 (5.4) 51.2 (5.4) 
    
Note: Entries represent the proportions of Green Party or FPÖ supporters who intend 
to vote for their preferred party in each condition, with standard errors in parentheses. 
The preferred party is defined as the party rated highest among all parties. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Key Results of Studies 
 
Key Aspects Economic Lab Experiment 
Psychological Lab 
Experiment 
Survey 
Experiment 
Coalition Signals Highly Effective Marginal Effect Conditional Effect 
Interpretation Useful but Risky Heuristic 
Non-Strategic 
Heuristic Deliberate Decision
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Figure 1: Game Screen of Economic Experiment 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Poll Results Screen of Psychological Experiment 
 
 
